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1. In his independent opinion in the Anglo-Iran Oil Co, Case, dating way back in 1952,
the Judge Alvarez would ascertain:
"All disputes between the states must be resolved in a pacific way and all the rights
recognized by the international law must be respected and must avail of sanctions... As far
as the protection of these rights is concerned, it is not necessary to establish whether the
prosecutor or the state against which the demand is initiated has accepted or not the com-
petence of the Court or whether they are or not the members of the United Nations. To-
day, any state in the world is a member of the international community or rather the inter-
national society; they are all subordinated to the international law and have the rights and
obligations the law prescribes. Unsustainable is the assumption that a state which is not a
member of the United Nations or which has not accepted the competence of the Court
would be allowed to violate the rights of another state without bringing it before the
Court; or vice versa, that a state which is a member of the United Nations would be al-
lowed to act in that way regarding to a state nonmember ... Therefore, the responsible
state may be brought before the Court without necessary investigation whether it has or
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has not accepted the competence of the Court or whether it has or has not accepted the
provisions of Article 36 (2) of its Statute."1
If and when this dictum would be estimated from the equity point of view, it could
hardly be objected. But, if and when it is estimated from the law point of view, ascertain-
ment that something desirable is in question, but not realistic, is simply unavoidable. And
not only unavoidable, but indisputable as well, which is, it must be admitted, a rare case
in international law.2 The international law which has, after all, as is also the case of law
in general, "broken free" from the ethics a long time ago and which recognizes only the
equity intra legem3; bases, to quote the independent opinion of the judge Higgins in the
Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force, "competence of the Court – although someone
could be sorry for that state of things at the time when we are entering the 21st century –
on assent".4
As far as the International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as "Court") is con-
cerned, it will persistently and consistently underline the consensual character of its com-
petence on any occasion on which its jurisdiction is called into question.5 In the dispute
that has opened a today already large list of over one hundred cases, in Corfu Channel
Case, it would say:
"Assent of parties in dispute provides the Court with competence."6
A couple of years later in the already mentioned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case the Court
will conceptually and functionally define the consensuality principle:
"The general rules contained in Article 36 of the Statute... are based on the principle
according to which the competence of the Court to consider and decide on the case meri-
tum depends on the will of parties to the dispute. If the parties to the dispute have not
vested the Court with the competence pursuant to Article 36, the Court shall not have
such competence."7
What are the messages of this dictum? The first of them is that the competence of the
                                                
1 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran) (Preliminary Objection), 22 July, 1952, I.C.J. Reports
1952, p. 132
2 On the consensuality principle and its effects it produces as per the competence of the Court see: Shabtai
Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International court, 2nd ed., 1985, 292 and passim: Fitzmaurice, The Law
and the Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-1954.
3 In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case the Court would declare that its decisions are based on the grounds
which "lie not beyond, but inside the rules and it is exactly (the principle, author's remark) the rule of the law
that requires application of the equity principle." North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of
Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. the Netherlands), Judgement of 20 February, 1969,
I.C.J. reports, 1969, paragraph 88.
4 Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Order of 2 June, 1999. Text according to
http://www.icj.cij.org/icjwww/indocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm. The same source is also for the texts of other
judgements of the Court, independent and disagreeing opinions, unless otherwise designated.
5 Sure, the consensuality principle is not an invention of the Court. As a worked out leading principle it is
already encountered in the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice which, for example, in
the Case Concerning East Carellia says: "In the international law clearly established is the principle that none
state is bound to submit its disputes with other states either to mediation or to arbitration or to any other
procedure of pacific settlement without its assent", Advisory Opinion, 23 July, 1923, P.C.I.J.S.B. No. 5, p. 27.
6 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), Preliminary Objection, I.C.J. Reports, 1948, p. 28..
7 Anglo-Iran Oil Co. Case  (United Kingdom v. Iran) (Preliminary Objection), 22 July, 1952, I.C.J. Reports,
1952, pp. 102-13.
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Court depends on the will of parties to the dispute. If there is a will of the parties to the
dispute to settle that dispute applying to the Court, the Court will be competent to resolve
the dispute. If, however, there is no any will, the Court cannot establish its jurisdiction in
the dispute. And how shall the existence or nonexistence of the will be established? How
to estimate the presence or absence of the so-called subjective or internal element? How
else if not through the objective element, through its manifestation. But not whatever, that
is, which manifestations, but through definite expressions of will. What are the expres-
sions of will the existence of which points to the Court that the consensuality principle is
satisfied in the concrete case? What does make the consensuality test? The answer to
these questions is provided – and this could be the second message of this case – by the
rules which represent its operationalization and concretization, and which are set forth in
Article 36 of the Statute. The third message to which the focus of attention is being
switched to on this occasion refers to the effects of application of this principle. If the
consesuality test shows that the principle is satisfied, the Court, to cite its words taken
from the advisory opinion in Effect of Award of Compensation Made by the United Na-
tions Administrative Tribunal, will be able to "dispense justice", by "considering the ar-
guments of the parties, evaluating the evidence provided by them, finding out the facts
and establishing the law to be applied in their case."8
But, should the test be negative, the Court will not have an opportunity to consider the
arguments of the parties to the dispute, to estimate the evidence provided, to find out the
facts and to establish the law of competence. The dispute meritum will remain entirely
beyond its province. And, thus, the question of possible violation of the internationally le-
gal norms as well.
This message has been clearly formulated by the Court in Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
in which it found out that there was no assent between the parties to the dispute that the
case should be subjected to its jurisdiction.9 It will be repeated, not referring to, contrary
to it custom, its heritage in Cases Concerning Legality of Use of Force in all decisions it
made as of that June 1999:
"there exists a fundamental difference between the question of accepting the compe-
tence of the Court by a state and the conformance of certain acts with the international
law; the first requests acceptance; the second question can be approached only when the
Court deals with meritum, only after it has established that it is competent and have heard
the entire legal argumentation of both parties."10
There could be doubt that the same result has thus been pointed to as it was in the case
in which this invention became the heritage of jurisprudence. This author is more apt to
think of it as a warning that the disputes regarding the use of force, as they are named, and
as they are classified by the Court, would remain without the solutions based on the law
                                                
8 Effect of Award of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion,
13 July, 1954, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 56.
9 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction, 4 December, 1998, paragraph 55, Cited after
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/indocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm.
10 Paragraph 47. The identical statement is contained in the decisions of all other cases initiated by FRY against
the member states of NATO. Since all ten decisions contain nearly identical opinions on nearly identical
questions, it is why the quotations from the decision in the case Yugoslavia v. Belgium are used in this paper.
A separate note follows quotations from other decisions.
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unless the competence of the Court would not be shown and proved. Sure, this is an ex-
ceptionally complex and voluminous task that by far exceeds the ambitions and possibili-
ties of this text. Everything that is desired here is, from the consensuality point of view, to
consider some questions related to the agreements that Yugoslavia has quoted as the ba-
sics of the competences of the Court in cases she has initiated against the member states
of NATO. But, let us look at them one after the other and let us see what disputes are in
fact in question.
2. On 24 March, 1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as
"NATO") commenced bombing targets in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia. As an answer to the "bombing campaign", the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
submitted a Demand for institution of proceedings to the Court Secretariat on April 29,
1999 (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v. United States of America, the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v. France,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v. the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia v. Italy, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v. Holland, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia v. Belgium, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v. Canada, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v. Portugal, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v.
Spain). In her Demand, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would request from the Court
to declare each of the states responsible for commitment of certain acts by means of
which they violate international law such as:
a) obligation to refrain from using force against any other state by participating in
bombing the territories of Yugoslavia;
b) obligation to refrain from interfering in internal affairs of another state by sup-
porting the so-called UCK;
c) obligation to spare civilian population, civilians and civilian premises by partici-
pating in attacks on the civil premises;
d) obligation not to perform enemy acts aimed to the cultural monuments, works of
arts and shrines which are cultural treasure and spiritual heritage of people by par-
ticipating in destroying monasteries and cultural monuments;
e) obligation not use prohibited arms, that is, arms that cause unnecessary sufferings
by participating in using cluster bombs;
f) obligation not to cause heavy damage to the environment by participating in
bombing oil refineries and chemical plants;
g) obligation not to use the prohibited arms and not to cause a long-term damage to
health and environment by participating in using arms which contain depleted ura-
nium;
h) obligation to respect the fundamental human rights by not participating in killing
civilians, destruction of enterprises, communications, institutions for health care
and cultural institutions;
i) obligation to respect freedom of navigation on the international rivers by not par-
ticipating in destruction of bridges on the international rivers;
j) obligation not to purposely subject a national group to the conditions of life that
would bring the group to the physical extermination, on the whole or in part, by
participating in the aforementioned activities and particularly by participating in
causing heavy damages to the environment and in using depleted uranium.
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At the same time, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has submitted the Demand for
temporary injunctions for protection to be enacted asking from the Court to order the sued
states to immediately suspend "performance of acts of using force and ... performing any act
which means threat by force or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".
Having heard the parties on May 10 and 11, 1999, the Court made decisions on June
2, 1999, under which it rejected the Demand of Yugoslavia for temporary injunctions in
all cases. Prevailing majority of judges11 were convinced that the Court "is not prima fa-
cie competent to consider the Demand for institution of proceedings of Yugoslavia".12
In the case against Spain and the United States, the Court has established that it
"is not obviously competent to consider the Demand for institution of the proceedings
of Yugoslavia ... that because of that it cannot enact any temporary injunction to protect
the rights cited therein."
And further:
"within the scope of the consensual competence system, placing on the General List of
events for which, it seems, it is safe that the Court would not be able to make a decision
on the meritum, would not, undoubtedly, contribute to the correct performance of jus-
tice".13
Therefore, the Court,
"Prescribes withdrawal of the case from the List."14
In the remaining eight cases the Court has concluded:
"that findings to which it ... has come in this proceedings in no way prejudice the
question of competence of the Court to deal with the meritum of the case or any question
on permission of the Demand for institution of proceedings or on the meritum itself".
and that
"they do not influence the rights of the governments of Yugoslavia and Belgium to
submit arguments in connection with these questions".15
The decisions by means of which the Court has rejected the Yugoslav Demand for en-
acting temporary injunctions of protection are a unique precedent. The Court has, for the
first time, referred to the nonexistence of prima facie competence with reference to each
of the bases of competence cited by Yugoslavia both in the Demand for institution of pro-
ceedings and in verbal discussion before the Court. And the cited bases of competence are
as follow:
a) statement of acceptance of optional clauses pursuant to Article 36.2 of the Court
                                                
11 "Results" of voting of judges were, to use sports terminology, as follows: 14 to 2 in the case against Spain, 13
to 3 in the case of Italy, 13 to 3 in the Case of France, Germany, Great Britain and USA, 12 to 4 in the case of
Belgium and Canada and 11 to 4 in the case of Holland and Portugal. Judges Shi and Vereshchetin voted
against the decision of the majority of judges in all ten cases. The presiding Weeramantry voted against the
Court decisions in the cases of Belgium, Holland, Portugal and Spain. As it has become usual practice,
considerable number of judges has decided to add their separate and disagreeing opinions. Separate opinions
have also been added by Oda, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren and Koojimans and that disagreeing by Weeramantry,
the chairman, and the judges Shi and Vereshchetin and  by the ad hoc judge Kreća.
12 See paragraph 45 of the decision in the case of Belgium.
13 Paragraph 20 of the Decision on the Case of FRY v. USA.
14 Ibid., paragraph 34.
15 Paragraph 46.
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Statute in dispute against Belgium, Canada, Holland, Portugal, Spain and Great
Britain;
b) Article IX of the Convention on Preventing and Punishing Crimes of Genocide in
all Disputes;
c) Article 36.5 of the Rules on the Procedure of the Court (the so-called forum pro-
rogatum) in the case against France, Germany, Italy and USA);
d) Article 4 of the Convention on Conciliation, on Court Hearing and Arbitration
signed by Belgium and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 25 March, 1930, and Arti-
cle 4 of the Agreement on Court Hearing, Arbitration and Conciliation signed by
Holland and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 11 March, 1931, in the Hague.16
e) Article 36, paragraph 1.
f) If the consensuality test, contained in Article 36 of the Statute, is taken as a start-
ing point, a conclusion can be drawn that the investigation dealing with the agree-
ment as a basis of legal competence is limited to the basis under b) and d), that is,
to "all cases provided ... under agreements and conventions in effect."
That it is, therefore, limited to the Convention on Preventing and Punishing the
Crimes of Genocide and bilateral agreements on the settlement of disputes with Belgium
and Holland. An in depth analysis, however, will show that one more agreement, the
agreement the effect of which could be proved to be of crucial importance for the com-
petence of the Court, the Charter of the United Nations, more precisely the Court Statute
which is its integral part, is in the province of investigation. Simply because the Statute is
an indispensable starting and the closing basis, expressed in which is the will of the par-
ties to entrust settlement of the dispute to the Court, the basis resting upon which are, and
which is assumes  by all other bases. The basis to which the analysis of each basis of
competence enumerated in Article 36 brings us back to. Sure, to which each of the basis
of competence Yugoslavia has referred to in her Demands for institution of the proceed-
ings bring us back to as well.
3. That connection is probably the least noticeable when the statement on accepting op-
tional clause is in question. Particularly if the effect of the optional clause to the compe-
tence of the Court is assessed according to the letter of its decisions in cases Legality to
use force. And the internal logics of these decisions probably even more. Here's the point.
The Court, in search of an answer to the question whether Article 36.2 can be a basis
for making provisional measures effective, starts by ascertaining that the parties to the
dispute have deposited statements on accepting compulsory competences of the Court of
parties to the dispute. Then, it gets us acquainted with the letter of statements and, straight
away, goes to investigating the effects resulting in each case from the reciprocity princi-
ple.
Let us trigger our memory that the reciprocity principle effect question in the elective
system or, as the Court uses to say, optional clause is one of those questions which are not
already for a long time the source of dilemmas. It is, now seems definitely, resolved al-
                                                
16 For detailed description of facts relevant to the dispute, see AJIL Vol. 93 No. 4, October, 1999, International
decision, pp. 928-933.
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ready in Interhandel Case:
"Reciprocity in the case of statement on accepting compulsory competence of the
Court enables one side to refer to the reservation to that acceptance which it has not put in
its own statement, but which the other party has put in its statement ... The reciprocity en-
ables the state whose acceptance of competence of the Court is wider to rely upon the res-
ervation to the acceptance which has been put by the other party. It is here where the reci-
procity effect ends. It cannot be referred to by the state ... which refers to the limitation
which the other party ... has not included in its statement."17
The reciprocity test application will show in the case Yugoslavia v. Great Britain and
in the case Yugoslavia v. Spain that the statements of these states are the statements that
entrust the Court with competence in narrower sense. They, among other things, contain
the reservation ratione materiae as well, which excludes the competence of the Court.
Paragraph 25 of the Decision Yugoslavia v. Great Britain reads:
"since Yugoslavia has deposited its statement on the acceptance of compulsory com-
petence with the Secretary-General on 26 April, 1999, and filed the Demand for institu-
tion of the proceedings on 29 April, 1999, it is beyond disputes that the conditions for ex-
clusion of the competence of the Court provided for in the second part of paragraph (iii)
of the first paragraph of the statement of Great Britain have been met in this case."18
In the remaining four cases the Court will find that it is the statement of Yugoslavia
that entrusts the competence in the narrower scope because it contains the ratione tempo-
ris reservation:
"Since Yugoslavia has accepted the competence of the Court ratione temporis only in
connection with, on the one hand, disputes arising or which may arise after signing of her
statement and, on the other hand, those referring to the situations and facts resulting after
that signing... to assess whether the Court is competent in this dispute (it is, author's re-
mark) enough to decide whether, according to the letter of the text of the statement, the
dispute submitted to the Court "had arisen" prior to or "arose" after 25 April, 1999, when
the statement had been signed." That reservation, the Court will find out after reformu-
lating the subject of the dispute, acts so that it excludes the competence of the Court.
Thus, the Court has lined up with the argumentation, regarding the reciprocity principle
effect, pointed out by Holland, Canada and Portugal. But, surely, it did not approve, in
that stage of the proceedings, the other direction of the argumentation offered, pointed out
not only by all the states against which Yugoslavia had referred to the optional clause, but
all ten sued states. Namely, it did not accept the standpoint that its competence could not
be based on Article 36.2 of the Statute simply because the statement of Yugoslavia, which
was not a member party to the Statute, was not valid. In other words, it did not accept the
assertion that the first and previous condition for establishment of the competence, the
mutuality principle, was not satisfied. But, has it rejected that argument? Not explicitly,
we would say.
For, after paragraph 30 in which the Court, summing up the results of the reciprocity
principle effects, concludes that "from the aforementioned follows that statements sub-
mitted by the parties according to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute are not a basis
                                                
17 I.C.J. Reports, 1959, p. 23.
18 Nearly the same formulation is contained in paragraph 25 of the Decision of Yugoslavia v. Spain.
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upon which the competence of the Court can prima facie be established in this case", fol-
lows paragraph 31 in which it concludes that the states sued have denied the validity of
the Yugoslav statement. The Court has in short summarized the already abundantly argu-
mented assertions that such state of things has resulted from the fact that the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia is not a successor of the SFRY as regards the membership in the
United Nations that she has not approached the Court in a manner prescribed for non-
members. Since the Court concludes in paragraph 32 that the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia has rejected these quotations, it will state in paragraph 33 that "in the light of its
findings from paragraph 30 above there is no need for the Court to consider this question
for the purpose of rendering a decision whether it can or cannot make provisional meas-
ures".
In his separate opinion, the judge Kooimans, who has, this is to be stressed, voted with
the majority of judges, will strongly criticize this conclusion of the Court:
"With due respects, I find this reasoning embarrassing, if not illogical and inconsis-
tent. How can the Court say that it is not necessary to consider the question of validity of
the statement of Yugoslavia, concluding at the same time that that statement, taken to-
gether with the statement of the accused, cannot make grounds for competence? That
conclusion is probably based on the assumption of validity of the Yugoslav statement, at
least at this stage of the proceedings. If that assumption does not exist, the Court had at
least to say that it accepts the validity exclusively arguendo since, and then, even if it
were valid, could not transfer the competence to the Court because of the limitation rati-
one temporis in the statement of the accused."
This author is inclined to partially accept the critical standpoint of the judge Kooi-
mans. Article 36.2 begins as follows:
"The parties to the Statue may at any moment..."
assumes, and the jurisprudence of the Court proves it without exception, that the first
things the Court has to do, in order to satisfy the consensuality request, is to establish
whether its first element, the element of mutuality, has been met. Namely, the Court must
show that the parties to the dispute have generally accepted the obligation of resolving the
dispute by applying to the Court. It must demonstrate that there is an agreement between
them, the agreement which is not and cannot be expressed in the statement on optional
clause which is according to its legal nature a one-sided statement of will, but is expressed
in the agreement, the Statute, the parties to which they are. In Right of Passage Case the
Court itself speaks about
"consensual obligation that is a basis of the Optional Clause"
To work it out in details in Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Be-
tween Cameroon and Nigeria. Referring to the aforementioned cited provisions, the Court
would ascertain:
"The conclusions thus drawn by the Court in 1957 reflect the very essence of the Op-
tional Clause for acceptance of the compulsory competence of the Court. Every state the
member party to the Statute, approving the competence of the Court according to Article
36, paragraph 2, accepts the competence in relations with the states that have previously
agreed to this clause. At the same time, it provides a permanent offer to other states the
member parties to the Statute that have not deposited their statements on acceptance yet.
As of the day one of these states accepts the offer by depositing on its side a statement on
the acceptance, the consensual obligation has been established and there is no other
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condition to be met."19
Whatever the objections on the account of the Court are, they, according to this
author, do not make a satisfactory basis in the case of the Court to deny the validity of the
old Latin dictum jura novit curia. Therefore it seems justified to conclude that the rea-
soning of the Court is based on the assumption of the validity of the Yugoslav statement,
that is, on the assumption that SRY is a member party to the Statute of the Court. In other
words, that the aforementioned parts of the decisions of the Court in the six cases in
which Article 36.2 has been referred to, at least, imply the standpoint of the Court that the
mutuality condition in these cases has been satisfied. Of course, to the extent to which it
was necessary in the decision-making procedure on the temporary injunctions.
But, whether the standpoint of the judge Kooimans is correct and, for example, that of
Oda that Yugoslavia is not a member of the United Nations, thus also not the member of
the Statute20, or the standpoint of the ad hoc judge Kreća, which this author approves as
well, there is a joint starting attitude in view of which they all agree: the consensuality
principle brings us back to the Statute also in the case of optional clause.
4. It seems to this author that the Court did not have much of the choice when the mutual-
ity condition was in question. For, to remember, it is the same Court which, only three
years earlier, stated in Case Concerning Application of the Convention of the Prevention
of Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that
"the status of Yugoslavia as a member party to the Convention on Genocide was not
denied"21
The Conventions on Genocide whose
"Article XI ... opens to every 'member of the United Nations'".22
And indeed, none of the states accused tried to deny the accuser the status of the con-
tracting party to the Convention on Genocide. A group of states will simply be satisfied to
eliminate the effect of its Article IX, contained in which is a compromissary clause, refer-
ring to the reservations they have set to that Article. To be more precise, the United States
and Spain are in question. Having established that the said states have really set the reser-
vations to Article IX, the Court, which in the Case Concerning Reservations to the Con-
vention on Genocide, has distinctly come out in favour of the allowableness of this type of
reservations23 was left nothing else but to conclude "that the Convention on Genocide
does not forbid reservations; ... that Yugoslavia did not object setting of reservations by
the United States to Article IX; ...that the said reservation acts so that it excludes this Ar-
ticle from the provisions of the Convention in effect between the parties"24 and to con-
clude "that as a consequence thereof, Article IX of the Convention on Genocide cannot be
a basis of competence of the Court to consider the dispute between Yugoslavia and the
                                                
19 Cameroon v. Nigeria (Preliminary Objections), paragraph 25. Quoted according to http.
20 See a separate opinion of the judge Oda, II Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Previous question.
21 Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgement 11 July, 1996, paragraph 17.
22 Ibiden, paragraph 19.
23 Case Concerning Reservations to the Convention on Genocide (Advisory Opinion), I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15.
24 Paragraph 75 of the decision in the case Yugoslavia v. USA.
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United States which supposedly is subject to its provisions."25
The remaining states will either recognize to Yugoslavia the status of the contracting
party to the Convention26 or will not at all come out on that question.27 They will direct
the focus of their argumentation so as to prove that Yugoslavia has not submitted essential
evidence that would back up the assertion that the acts she imputes to the states accused
are not within the province of the Convention because she did not succeed in demon-
strating the existence of the subjective element of this criminal act, the intention. The
Court will accept their argumentation. That strategy of agreement will be commenced by
the assertion "that the Court, in order to establish, even prima facie, whether there is a
dispute pursuant to Article IX of the Convention on Genocide, cannot limit itself to con-
clude that one of the contracting parties claims that the Convention is applied and the
other to deny it; and ... that in this case the Court has to establish whether the violations of
the Convention cited by Yugoslavia are such that they could be subjected to the provi-
sions of this instrument and whether, as a consequence thereof, this dispute is such that
the Court is competent ratione materie to consider it according to Article IX."28
Having concluded "that threat by force or use of force against a state cannot be
deemed by itself an act of genocide pursuant to Article II of the Convention on Genocide;
and since, according to the opinion of the Court, bombardment, which is the subject of the
Demand for institution of the proceedings of Yugoslavia in this stage of the proceedings
'does not seem to contain the element of intention, towards the group as such,29 which is
required by the above cited provision'"30,
The Court will, without much troubles, conclude that "it is not in position in this phase
of the proceedings to establish that the acts which Yugoslavia ascribes to the accused can
be subjected to the provisions of the Convention on Genocide; and since Article IX of the
Convention, which Yugoslavia refers to, cannot, in connection with this, be a basis based
upon which the competence of the Court prima facie could be grounded in this case."31
This viewpoint of the Court underwent a fiercely worded criticism by the disagreeing
judges and much else could not be added to this criticism. Even the judge Parra-
Arangueren will in his separate opinion say:
"Article IX of the Convention on Genocide is the only prima facie basis of the com-
petence of the Court in this case. Therefore, the only temporary injunctions it can make are
those directed to the protection of rights of the accuser under the Convention on Genocide."
                                                
25 Ibid., paragraph 76.
26 Thus, Holland will, for example, ascertain that although she is not a contracting party to the Convention on
the Succession of States in the International Agreements, she recognises to Yugoslavia the status of a
contracting party to the Convention on Genocide due to a particular character of this Convention. See
Yugoslavia v. Holland, Public Sitting, 10 May, 1999.
27 See, for example, Yugoslavia v. Canada, Public Sitting, 10 May, 1999. That approach, but as an alternative,
will  be approved by Portugal as well. She will, as a first thing, ascertain that the Convention is not effective
between the parties because at the moment when Yugoslavia submitted the Demand for institution of the
proceedings Portugal was not a contracting party to the Convention. See Yugoslavia v. Portugal, Public Sitting
11 May, 1999.
28 Paragraph 38 of the Decision in the case Yugoslavia v. Belgium.
29 Paragraph 7.
30 Ibid., paragraph 39.
31 Ibid., paragraph 40.
 An Agreement as a Basis of the Competence of the International Court of Justice... 419
5. Finally, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has also in the case against Belgium and in
the case against Holland referred to the bilateral agreements concluded by the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia at the Convention on Conciliation, on the judicial hearing and on the arbi-
tration between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Belgium signed on 25 March, 1930, in
Belgrade32 and the Agreement on Judicial Hearing, Arbitration and Conciliation between
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Holland signed in the Hague on 11 March, 1931.33
Yugoslavia has pointed out these two bases in the "Supplement to the Demand" in the
second part of the hearing that will, according to the letter of the Decision, compel the
Court to take note of this basis, but not to consider it. In the identically formulated para-
graphs 44 the decision of the Court will be:
"Whereas reference of a party to the new basis of competence in the second round of
the hearing on the Demand for provisional measures has never appeared in the Court
practice; whereas that such activity in this late phase, if not accepted by the other party,
seriously endangers the principle of fair procedure and the principle of correct exercise of
justice; and ...  as a consequence thereof, the Court cannot, for the purpose of making a
decision whether it can or cannot take provisional measures in this case, take into consid-
eration the new basis of competence that Yugoslavia tried to cite on 12 May, 1999."
That viewpoint will meet with the disapproval of the disagreeing judge Vereschhetin.
He will ascertain:
"The legitimate concern of the Court to respect the 'principle of fair procedure and
correct performance of justice' cannot be expanded to the measure to exclude a priori ad-
ditional basis of competence, only because the sued state has not been given enough time to
prepare counterarguments. As it is known, it cannot be deemed normal to cite the new basis
of competence in the second phase of the hearing. Nevertheless, the sued states have been
given the possibility to present their counterarguments before the Court and they have made
use of that possibility providing different observations and objections regarding the new
basis of competence. They could, if necessary, request extension of the hearing."
That what the Court, according to him, should have done was to subject the cited ad-
ditional bases of competence to the test of their acceptability as the bases of competence
for temporary injunctions. The test, which, starting from Article 38 of the Rules on the
Court Proceedings, has crystallized itself in its jurisprudence:
"It should be noted that Yugoslavia, submitting the Demand for initiation of the pro-
ceedings, has reserved the right to change and supplement it. Such reservation is, together
with the initiation of the proceedings, a standard one and, with reference to the basic
competences, the Court has been interpreting it as a permission for the basis of compe-
tence to be added, under the condition that the prosecutor makes it plain that he intends to
persist on that basis and, also, under the condition that the result shall not be a transfor-
mation of the dispute, that under the Demand for initiation of the proceedings has been
                                                
32 The King Alexander passed the Law on ratification of this Convention on 30 June, 1930. The text of the Law
and the Convention is according to the Proceedings of International Agreements 1930 II, Agreements and
conventions proclaimed in 1930, Book II, pp. 849-864.
33 The King Alexander passed the Law on Ratification on 31 July, 1931. The text of the Agreement according
to the Proceedings of International Agreements 1932, Agreements and conventions were proclaimed in 1932,
pp. 67-75.
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brought before the Court, into another dispute, different in character."
The test which, according to him, has been fully satisfied in these cases. That conclu-
sion, with more elaborated arguments, will also be made by the ad hoc judge Kreća.34
In the course of the hearing, Belgium and Holland have presented arguments that are
intended not only to show that Yugoslavia has, by pointing to these bases in the late phase
of the procedure, violated the subject principles and that, therefore, they should not be
taken into consideration at this stage of the proceedings, but also to show and prove that
the competence of the Court cannot at all be based upon them. The arguments presented
are somewhat similar, but considerably different, since the mentioned agreements contain
different  stipulations. And those differences are such that they dictate separate
consideration of these two cases. May we be allowed, first, to present somes notes in the
case of Holland.
Holland will, in the oral hearing, ascertain that the Agreement on Judicial Hearing,
Arbitration and Conciliation does not create a basis for the competence of the Court
simply because that Agreement is not effective between the parties to the dispute. Holland
is not, as her agents will point as the first evidence, a contracting party to the Vienna
Convention on succession of states in the international agreements of 1978, so that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not on the basis of its provisions "inherit" the status
of the contracting party. In addition, Holland will further cite, in favour of her assertion,
that this Agreement does not fall into the group of bilateral agreements on the term
extension of which the two parties have reached an agreement.35 It is beyond the
knowledge of this author whether this assertion is correect or not. It should be checked by
an insight into the official correspondence of the two states. Thefore, the following
comments will be based upon the assumption that this Agreement falls into the group of
agreements which are in effect in the relations between the two states. After all, the thrid
argument to be pointed out by Holland has been so devised that she supposes their
validity. And it is that Yugoslavia has not met procedural prerequisites provided for under
the Agreement to refer to the Court. The only violation of the procedure to which Holland
has concretely pointed to is that Yugoslavia has not respected the term of one month
between the notice that there is a desire to subject the dispute to the judiciary settlement
and the lodging of the "complaint" to the Court required under the Agreement.
The text of the Agreement seems to have not left much choice to Holland, according
to this autor. Truly, its Article 2  provides for that "All disputes, of whatever nature they
are, the subject of which would be the law recognized by one of the High Contracting
Parties, and which would be denied by the other party, and which could not be settled by
ordinary dimplomatic procedures" shall be submitted to the Court.
It seems that possible proving that it was really a dispute that could not be settled by the
diplomaticits way does not fall into the sphere of unfeasible. On the contrary. As for the
proceedings before the Permanent Commission, that is, Permanent International Commision
, it is provided for under Article 3 as a proceedings the parties can, but need not resort to:
"Prior to any proceedings before the Permanent Court of Intenrtional Justice and prior to any
arbitration proceedings, the dispute may be, according to mutual agreement between the
                                                
34 See Part IV Additional bases of competence of his disagreeing opinion.
35 Paragraph 43 of the Decision in the case of Yugoslavia v. Holland.
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parties, submitted for conciliation to the Permanent Interntional Commision, called
Permanent  Conciliation Commission, established under this Agreement."
Consequently, there remains Article 4 of the Agreement which reads:
"If, in case of a dispute provided for under Article 2, both parties have not referred to
the Permanent Conciliation Commission, or if this has not managed to consiliate the
parties, the dispute will be, by mutual consent, submitted either to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, which will be resolved under the conditions and according to the
procedure provided for under its Statute or to the Arbitration Court ...
For want of a consent between the parties on the choice of the judiciary power, on
expressions of compromise, or, in case of arbitartion proceedings, on appointment of
arbitrars, one or the other between them, after the one-month notice, shall have the rights
to directly submit the dispute, by means of a compalint, before the Permanent Court of
International Justice."
Paragraph 2 of this Article, quite clearly, provides grounds to Holland to object that
Yugoslavia has not respected the term of one month between the notice that there is a
desire to subject the dispute to the judiciary settlement and the lodging of the "complaint"
to the Court required under the Agreement. That objection will not surprise the Yugoslav
party. Expecting it, doubtlessly, she will, at the oral hearing, immediately after pointng to
the additional basis, refer to the "principle that the Court should not punish the procedural
omission that can easily be corrected".
It is the principle that was already well established in the jurisprudence of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. In the case of Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions the following standpoint can be encountered:
"Even although the grounds upon which the initiation of the preceedings are deffective
based upon the said reason, that is not an adequate reason to reject the prosecutor's
charges. The Court, the competence of which is international, is not bound to attach the
same degree of imporatnce to the questions of form that they may have in the domestic
law. Consequently, if the demand was hasty because the Agreement from Lausanne had
not been ratified yet, now that corcumstance was covered by the subsequently deposited
necessary ratification instruments."36
In Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia we will notice the same principle:
"Even though, according to Article 23, the existence of a certain dispute is necessary,
that condition can be satisfied at any moment by the unilateral action of the prosecutor.
The Court cannot allow to be hindered by an ordinary lack of form, the elimination of
which exclusively depends upon the interested party."37
As for the Court, it has, referring to the just quoted heritage of his functional prede-
cessor recently applied the mentioned principle in the already quoted Genocide Case:
"In this case, even though the parties, each of which was bound by the Convention at
the moment when the demand for institution of the proceedings was submitted, were
found out to be mutually bound beginning from 14 December, 1995, the Court could not
reject its competence upon those grounds, since Bosnia and Herzegovina can at any mo-
ment submit a new demand, identical to this, and which in that case cannot be called into
                                                
36 Mavromatis Palestine Concessions. P. C. I. J., Series A, No. 2. p. 34.
37 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, P. C. I. J., Series a, No. 6, p. 14.
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question."38
But, may we switch the reader's focus of attention to only one dictum of the Court be-
longing to its heritage, the dictum in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua:
"It would be senseless to require from Nicaragua to bring charges based upon the
agreement that fully empowers her to do that."39
Really, would not that be senseless to require from the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via, more that one year after the Demand for institution of the proceedings has been sub-
mitted, to bring new charges based upon the Agreement the first article of which reads:
"High Contracting Parties shall be bound in no case to request settlement of disputes
and conflicts by other than pacific ways and only according to the methods provided for
under this Agreement, that might arise between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Holland
and which could not be settled, over the suitable period, by ordinary diplomatic actions."
And when it is, partly thanks to the procedure on provisional measures, quite clear that
"lack of agreement between the parties on the choice of the judicial power", is in
question, when, according to the letter of the very Agreement each of the parties is
authorised to institute the proceedings before the Court.
The said principle will also produce the same effect in the case of Belgium, sure, if
pointed out by her. Article 6 of the Convention allows her to rely upon it in the next stage
of the proceedings:
"In the lack of agreement between the parties on the compromise provided for in the
previous article or if the elective judges have not been appointed, according to the notice
made three months in advance, one or the other party shall have the possibility, by means
of an application, to bring the debatable question directly before the Permanent Interna-
tional Court."
But her objection was worded differently, wider. At the hearing, Belgium would say
"that, according to the letter of Convention (of 1930, author's remark), referring to
P.C.I.J. is a subsidiary remedy", and ... that Yugoslavia 'has failed to exhaust previous
procedures the exhaustion of which is a necessary condition to recourse to P.C.I.J.'". 40
However, it is hard to see what made Belgium to ascertain that reference to the Court
is a "subsidiary remedy" when the subject Article 4 reads:
"All debatable questions, according to which the parties would deny each other a cer-
tain right, will be submitted to the Permanent International Court for judgement, unless
the parties agree, pursuant to the below mentioned provisions, that they will have recourse
to the court of choice.
Sure that the above discussed debatable questions particularly include those questions
which are mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent International Court."
After all, to which procedure the Belgian objection of nonexhausted previous proce-
dures could refer? If provision of Article 1 which says that "Debatable questions of any
kind that would arise between the High Contracting Parties and which could not be settled
                                                
38 Paragraph 26.
39 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) I. C. J.
Reports, 1984, pp. 428-429, para. 83.
40 Paragraph 43 of the Decision.
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by the diplomatic way" is thought of, there we would be satisfied to repeat the conclusion
stated when it comes to the similar provision in the Convention with Holland.41
Also, there is little likelihood that it is anything more valid if conciliation were thought
of. Because the relevant Article 7 could hardly be interpreted so as to provide conciliation
as a procedure which compulsory precedes the judiciary settlement of disputes:
"As for the debatable questions provided for under Article 4, prior to any proceedings
before the Permanent International Court, or prior to any arbitration proceedings, the par-
ties will be able, by mutual agreement, to have recourse to conciliation provided for under
this Convention."
The provision which in French reads: "les Parties pourront, d'un commun accord, re-
courir à la procédure de conciliation" cannot be interpreted as an obligation to first have
recourse to conciliation. It seems that this conclusion – the conclusion that conciliation is
not a necessary prerequisite to refer to the Court – necessarily follows from the letter of
Article 8 of the Convention:
"All debatable questions between the Parties, except those provided for under Article
4 will compulsory be subjected to the conciliation procedure before they could be made a
subject of the arbitration hearing."
Conciliation is, it is crystal clear now, compulsory only in the case an arbitral dispute
settlement is intended to be recoursed to. Moreover, Article 8 could easily be interpreted
such as that it excludes the disputes subjected to the competence of the Court from the
obligation to have recourse to conciliation.
But, the argument of nonexhausting previous procedures is another, alternative direc-
tion of the arguments of Belgium. According to the first one, the Court should exclude the
Convention as a basis of competence because the "Convention of 1930 entrusts compe-
tence not to the Court but to P.C. I. J." ... and (that, author's remark) it claims that Article
37 of the Statute in this case does not produce effects.
To remind. Article 37 of the Statute reads:
"When an agreement or convention in effect provides for presentation of some ques-
tion before some court that should be established by the League of Nations or before the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the question will be brought, if contracting par-
ties to this Statue are in question, before the International Court of Justice."
In Ambatielos Case the Court will say that provisions of Article 37 "act so that these
references to the Permanent Court of International Justice in the agreements must now
be interpreted like references to the International Court of Justice."42
                                                
41 It seems that the dispute as defined under the Demand for institution of the proceedings as well as defined by
the Court in its Decision, does not fall into the exceptions from the obligation of the judiciary settlement of
disputes provided for under paragraph 2 of this Article: this obligations shall not be applicable to:
debatable questions which have arisen prior to the conclusion of this Convention;
debatable questions referring to the questions left by international law to the exclusive competence of states;
debatable questions bearing on the territorial statute (au statut territorial) of High Contracting Parties."
According to the provisions of paragraph 3, disputes on whether the concrete question falls into the rank of
indicated exceptions shall be resolved, not bringing up the essence of the subject, by the Court upon the request
of one of the parties.
42 Ambatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objection, Judgement 1 July, 1952, I. C. J.
Reports 1952, p. 39.
V. KNEŽEVIĆ-PREDIĆ424
But, the request that the agreement shall expressly refer to the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice is only one of the requests contained in Article 37, but confirmed in the
jurisprudence of the Court. There is also a request that there shall be in question agree-
ment in effect between the contracting parties and the request that the parties to the dis-
pute shall be at the same time the contracting parties of the Statute. The assumption is that
the intention of Belgium was nonfulfilment of these requests when she ascertained that
"Article 37 of the Statute in this case does not produce effects".
This, in the first case, brings us back to the question whether it is here the agreement
in effect between the parties and, in the second, to the question whether the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia is the member of the Statute of the Court or not.
6. At the very beginning of this text we have quoted a high moral viewpoint of the judge
Alvarez. Quickly and easily, backed by the generous support of judicial heritage, we have
shown that development of international law has not taken the direction, to paraphrase the
judge Higgins, that some maybe wanted. And, half a century after, the judicial settlement
of disputes requires investigation whether the prosecutor and the accused have accepted
the competence of the Court.
Using some more efforts and without abundant support by the jurisprudence of the
Court, we believe we have shown that not even its another assumption can be fully ac-
cepted. We have shown that membership in the United Nations is not irrelevant for the
question of the competence of the Court. After all, a significant number of judges have
also pointed to this. Both, which is particularly interesting, those who have voted together
with the judging majority and the disagreeing ad hoc judge Kreća. The judge Oda will at
the very beginning of his long separate opinion say:
"The Court is open for contracting parties of its Statute (Article 35). The contracting
paties shall only be allowed to bring cases before the Court. From that, in my opinion,
follows that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is not a member of the United
Nations and consequently even a contracting party to the Statute of the Court, has no
legitimacy before the Court to request institution of the proceedings. The Demand for
institution of the proceedings brough by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should,
therefore, be proclaimed not allowed only for that reason and should be removed form the
General List of the Court."
The judge Oda seems to equalize the question of the status of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in the United Nations as well as the question of the status with reference to the
Statute. To deny his final conclusion, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would, moreo-
ver, have to prove first of all that she is a member of the United Nations, based upon
which she would prove that she is also a contracting party to the Statute.
On his part, the ad hoc judge Kreća will say:
"It would be, of course, unreasonable to expect from the Court to make a decision on
that whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a member of the United Nations or
not. Such expectation would not be in keeping with the nature of the judiciary function
and would mean to go deeper into the sphere of  principal political organs of the world's
Organization – the Security Council and the General Asembly.
But, I am deeply convinced that the Court should answer the question whether the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the light of the contents of Resolution 47/1 of the
General Assembly and the pratice of the world's Organization, can or cannot be
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considered a member of the United Nations and, particularly, a contracting party to the
Statute of the Court."
After all, it seems to this author that it would be not only unreasonable but, from the
positive law point of view, inadmissible as well that the Court shall makle a decision on
the question of membership, that is, status of a state in the Organization. But, that which is
not only reasonable and from the law point of view permissible, but necessary, is that the
Court shall decide on whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a party to the Statute
or not. This author believes that she has shown that that necessity is dictated by the con-
sensuality principle, that undoubtedly principal guiding principle of the Court.
There is little likelihood that the authorization of the Court to interpret the Statute
could be called into question. Also, it is the least likely, we would say not at all, that the
status of the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with reference to the Statute
could be discussed beyond the contractual law. The thus defined competent law in no way
excludes the importance of the decisions made within the United Nations. But it, surely,
states precisely their role in the proceedings in which the Court "dispenses justice" in the
way that it should "consider arguments of the parties, estimate evidence they have
presented to it, establish the facts and stipulate the law to be applied to them".43
And that is the role of the source of evidence.
At the same time, defining the question of the status of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia as a key and starting one would enable to create a complete structure of arguments
within which that not debatable (status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with refer-
ence to the Convention on Preventing and Punishing Crimes of Genocide, for example)
may also appear as evidence to be presented by the states sued and the Court.
UGOVOR KAO OSNOV NADLEŽNOSTI U SPOROVIMA
SR JUGOSLAVIJE PROTIV DRŽAVA ČLANICA NATO
Vesna Knežević-Predić
Autor u ovom tekstu analizira dejstvo ugovora na koje se, kao osnov nadležnosti
Medjunarodnog suda pravde, SR Jugoslavija pozvala u postupcima protiv deset država članica
NATO. Prevashodni cilj te analize je identifikacija efekata koje proizvodi primena načela
konsensualnosti i to kako efekata njegovih posebnih izraza – načela uzajamnosti i reciprociteta –
tako i efekata testa konsensualnosti koji je sadržan u odredbama člana 36.
Ključne reči: ugovor, Medjunarodni sud pravde, načelo konsensualnosti, načelo uzajamnosti,
načelo reciprociteta
                                                
43 Effect of Award of Compensation Made by United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 13
July 1954, I. C. J. Reports 1954, p. 56.
